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A CHAMPION FOR AFRICAN FREEDOM: PAUL ROBESON AND
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID
Penelope Andrews*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2013, I was honored to deliver the Paul Robeson
lecture at Columbia Law School, an annual event to commemorate
the life and legacy of Paul Robeson, a graduate of Columbia Law
School (Class of 1923). This article is a slightly expanded version of
my lecture.1
This article will have four components: first, it will highlight the
achievements of this extraordinary man, an advocate for social
justice, a world-renowned artist, and an accomplished sportsman.
Second, in this article I explore Paul Robeson's connections and
commitment to the African anti-colonial struggle, and in particular
the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Third, this article
examines the legal developments in South Africa with the collapse
of formal apartheid, and outlines the broad contours of the
constitutional text, particularly the bill of rights and the
constitutional and human rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Court. Finally, the article will end with the question: what would
Paul Robeson say about the contemporary moment that post-
apartheid South Africa finds itself in?
Professor Acklyn Lynch, in his 1976 article, Paul Robeson: His
Dreams Know No Frontiers, said this of Paul Robeson: 'Mr. Robeson
* B.A., LL.B., Natal, LL.M., Columbia. The author wishes to thank Marianne Stewart
(Albany Law School Class of 2014) and Michael Nunziata (CUNY Class of 2005) for research
assistance.
I In my lecture I noted that it was a great honor for me to be at Columbia Law School to
celebrate the life of one of America's finest sons-Paul Robeson. Before I began my
comments, I noted my gratitude to my friend and colleague, Professor Kendall Thomas, for
inviting me to address the distinguished audience. I always like returning to Columbia Law
School, where as a graduate student in the 1980s I was privileged to encounter many
wonderful people who have become lifelong friends and colleagues, and where I had some of
the most memorable experiences of my life. I particularly wanted to remember the late
Professor Kellis Parker, who was a teacher, a friend, and an all-round terrific bloke, without
whom my Columbia Law School experience would have been less memorable.
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was a man whose versatility has been unparalleled in American
history as scholar, linguist, actor, singer, athlete, humanitarian,
and whose striving for excellence in every undertaking was
embroidered by a deep humility which endeared him to the hearts
of millions of people around the world." 2
On February 19, 2001, the Columbia Daily Spectator, in an article
to accompany the Paul Robeson Annual Lecture, said this about
Paul Robeson:
Paul Robeson, [Columbia] Law '23, struggled against racism
his entire life. As a scholar he encountered intolerance while
trying to achieve a higher education. As an artist he tried to
unify people through music, once performing slave spirituals
alongside Russian serf songs. And, most significantly,
Robeson risked his entire artistic career to break down
barriers of race not only in the United States but around the
world as well. 3
II. BIOGRAPHY
We know that Paul Robeson was born in Princeton, New Jersey
on April 9, 1898, the son of a former slave who became a preacher.
4
He was a talented child who demonstrated great promise in
academics, music, and athletics. 5 At the age of seventeen, Paul
Robeson won a statewide writing competition that earned him a
four-year scholarship to Rutgers University. 6
Paul Robeson was the third African-American ever to enroll in the
university, and despite intimidation from his teammates, he joined
the football team.7 A two-time All-American for football, he also
earned fifteen varsity letters in basketball, baseball, and track.8
During his college career, Paul Robeson won the school's annual
oratory contest four times, once speaking out against the
inadequate educational opportunities for African-Americans. 9
2 Acklyn R. Lynch, Paul Robeson: His Dreams Know No Frontiers, 45 J. OF NEGRO EDUC.
225, 225 (1976).
3 Michelle J. Lee, Broadway Legend Paul Robeson Remembered, COLUM. DAILY
SPECTATOR, Feb. 19, 2001, at 9.
4 MARTIN BAUML DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON 4 (1989).
5 See Lamont H. Yeakey, A Student Without Peer: The Undergraduate College Years of
Paul Robeson, 42 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 489, 490 (1973).
6 LINDSEY R. SWINDALL, PAUL ROBESON: A LIFE OF ACTIVISM AND ART 18 (2013).
7 See DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 19.
8 Id. at 22.
9 See Yeakey, supra note 5, at 498. It is interesting to note that another great African-
American legal legend, the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, was also an excellent orator, a
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After graduating from Rutgers, Paul Robeson was accepted to
Columbia Law School, and to help pay for tuition, he played
professional football and tutored in Latin. 10 He graduated from
Columbia and worked briefly at a law firm, but he resigned when a
white secretary refused to work for him.11 Paul Robeson then vowed
that he would never enter "any profession where the highest prizes
were from the start denied to [him]," and turned to the stage. 12
A. An Internationalist Humanitarian
Paul Robeson was one of those early twentieth century
internationalist humanitarians who connected at a deep and
profound level with the struggles of his own community in the
United States, but also with those people everywhere who struggled
against racism, fascism, colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid. 13
What is remarkable is his courage and determination, operating in
the much diminished space for dissent during the Cold War era.1 4
To talk about Paul Robeson is almost to peddle in cliches: a
renaissance man, a fearless fighter for freedom, brilliant. 15 And yet,
these words describe him so accurately. 16
There is no doubt that Paul Robeson set the stage for future
generations of African-Americans to connect the struggle against
racism in the United States to the global struggle for peace, justice,
economic equality, and human dignity, including leaders like
Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and others.1 7 He participated very
actively in the struggles for independence from colonial domination
by organizing in 1937 the Council on African Affairs, which was
skill which was cultivated very early on in his life. See LARRY S. GIBSON, YOUNG THURGOOD:
THE MAKING OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 68 (2012).
10 DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 34.
11 Id. at 54-55.
12 Id. at 55.
13 See Frankie Nicole Weaver, Art Against Apartheid: American and South African
Cultural Activism and Networks of Solidarity 62-69 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University at Buffalo, State University of New York), available at
http://gradworks.umi.com/3554519.pdf.
14 See id. at 75.
15 Paul Robeson's artistic talents, his passion for justice, and his oratory skills were
exceptional. See Philip S. Foner, Paul Robeson: Great Artist, Great American, in PAUL
ROBESON SPEAKS: WRITINGS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, 1918-1974, at 3, 23-24 (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1978) (introducing writings, speeches, and interviews of Paul Robeson); SWINDALL, supra
note 6, at 2.
16 Foner, supra note 15, at 23-24; SWINDALL, supra note 6, at 2.
17 See Henry J. Richardson, III, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As An International Human
Rights Leader, 52 VILL. L. REV. 471, 472 (2007).
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dedicated to new relations with Africa.18 At a rally sponsored by the
Council at Madison Square Garden in 1946, Paul Robeson stated,
"[t]he race is on in Africa as in every other part of the world-the
race between the forces of progress and democracy on one side and
the forces of imperialism and reaction on the other."19  Paul
Robeson's central influence in the global anti-colonial movement
has been analyzed by international legal scholars20 and scholars of
Africa.21
These are brief comments about the dedication of Paul Robeson to
the anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid struggle. One indication of
his profound contribution was the Tribute to Paul Robeson at the
United Nations on April 10, 1978, what would have been his
eightieth birthday.22 In his tribute to Paul Robeson, Mr. Mfanafuthi
J. Makatini, Representative of the African National Congress of
South Africa at the United Nations, noted: "In South Africa, Paul
Robeson is considered an outstanding champion of the emancipation
of the country, no doubt, when the time comes, since victory in
South Africa is now as certain as sunrise, he will be one of the first
to be honoured by our people. '23
Paul Robeson was a brilliant man, astonishing in his many
abilities, "who unfortunately had to pay dearly for the specifics of
his politics," notes Professor Marcellus Blount, who continued:
"That's always the difficult historical scenario, particularly
when African-American leaders achieved a certain degree of
notoriety, which can militate against their actual
accomplishments. In that regard Paul Robeson is a product
of American society of contradictions that his life story
presents, which seems to me to be inherent in the African-
American experience. '24
And Paul Robeson did pay for his political convictions,
commencing in 1950, when his passport was revoked for speaking
out against the Korean War and for his refusal to deny he was a
18 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMM. AGAINST APARTHEID, DIMENSIONS OF THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST APARTHEID: A TRIBUTE To PAUL ROBESON 10, 45 (John Henrik Clarke ed., 1979).
19 FRANCIS NJUBI NESBITT, RACE FOR SANCTIONS: AFRICAN AMERICANS AGAINST
APARTHEID, 1946-1994, at 1 (2004).
20 See e.g., id. at 1-2.
21 See e.g., Charles Musser, Presenting "A True Idea of the African of To-day": Two
Documentary Forays by Paul and Eslanda Robeson, 18 FILM HIST. 412, 412 (2006).
22 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL CoMM. AGAINST APARTHEID, supra note 18, at 1.
23 Id. at 58.
24 Lee, supra note 3.
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Communist. 25
Although the passport was finally restored in 1958, Robeson
was blacklisted for his political views. According to Blount,
the backlash proved a double-standard.
"What fascinates me is the way in which Americans, even
today, are more inclined to respond to African-Americans
who achieve a degree of artistic brilliance, but the spectrum
of the black politician, especially the black male politician,
produces anxieties. Paul Robeson's life is instructive of the
American willingness to accept leadership in a certain
context."2
6
For his political views, particularly his unflinching commitment
to justice and equality, Paul Robeson spent many years in political
exile, vilified by the political establishment. 27
B. Testimony of Robeson and Mandela
While I was preparing to deliver the Paul Robeson Annual
Lecture, I unearthed the testimony of Paul Robeson to the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. This testimony provided for
me a point of comparison between Nelson Mandela's testimony in
the dock during the Rivonia trial.28 I abbreviate and summarize the
two testimonies below.
1. Paul Robeson's Testimony Before House Committee On Un-
American Activities
I have struggled for years for the independence of the
25 DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 329, 388.
26 Lee, supra note 3, at 9; see also DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 389-90, 463 (describing the
revocation and restoration of Robeson's passport).
27 See generally DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 406, 409, 423-24 (describing various
instances of Robeson's vilification).
28 For Paul Robeson's testimony, see Investigation of the Unauthorized Use of United
States Passports-Part & Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Un-American Activities, 84th
Cong. 4492-4510 (1956) [hereinafter Passport Hearing] (statement of Paul Robeson) and
THIRTY YEARS OF TREASON: EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1938-1968, at 770-89 (Eric Bentley ed., 1971). In 1963, Nelson
Mandela and nine leaders of the African National Congress were tried for treason and acts of
sabotage in their role to overthrow the apartheid government. KENNETH S. BROUN, SAVING
NELSON MANDELA: THE RIVONIA TRIAL AND THE FATE OF SOUTH AFRICA 6, 7-9 (2012). Known
as the Rivonia trial because of the place where the arrests were made, the trial lasted two
years. Id. at xviii. For a thoughtful and expansive discussion of the trial, see KENNETH S.
BROUN, SAVING NELSON MANDELA: THE RIVONIA TRIAL AND THE FATE OF SOUTH AFRICA




colonial peoples of Africa. . . . The other reason that I am
here today is ... that when I am abroad I speak out against
the injustices against the Negro people of this land. . . . This
is the basis and I am not being tried for whether I am a
Communist, I am being tried for fighting for the rights of my
people who are still second-class citizens in this United
States of America .... I stand here struggling for the rights
of my people to be full citizens in this country and they are
not. They are not in Mississippi and they are not in
Montgomery, Ala., and they are not in Washington, and they
are nowhere, and that is why I am here today. You want to
shut up every Negro who has the courage to stand up and
fight for the rights of his people, for the rights of workers and
I have been on many a picket line for the steelworkers too.
And that is why I am here today. 29
2. Nelson Mandela's Testimony at the Rivonia Trial
The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the
direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White
supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to
preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion.
[W]hites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They
do not look upon them as people with families of their own;
they do not realise that we have emotions-that we fall in
love like white people do; that we want to be with their wives
and children like white people want to be with theirs; that
we want to earn money, enough money to support our
families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to
school .... During my lifetime I have dedicated my life to
this struggle of the African people. I have fought against
white domination, and I have fought against black
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and
free society in which all persons will live together in
harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal for
which I hope to live for and to see realised. But, My Lord, if
it needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. 30
29 Passport Hearing, supra note 28, at 4499.
30 Nelson Mandela, I Am Prepared to Die: Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at
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I provide a comparison of these two men because of some
similarities. There are the obvious ones; first are their identities as
black men, highly educated, extraordinarily attuned to the second-
class status of their communities. Second, both men were trained in
law at premiere universities, as minorities in their classes, and both
excelled despite the hostile learning environments and limited post-
graduate career opportunities. 3 1  But the comparison is most
compelling because both men lived and advocated for their
principles at a time when the demands for justice, dignity, and
equality for black people were treated with hostility by the wider
(white) society. They risked not just villification (both men were
accused of being Communists, for example), but they certainly
risked their freedom and death.32
III. PAUL ROBESON'S VALUES As EMBODIED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION
I will broadly outline several values that are embodied in Paul
Robeson's advocacy, and which are incorporated in South Africa's
Constitution and Bill of Rights, and which have been interpreted in
a series of judgments of South Africa's Constitutional Court. These
values include: democracy and rights of citizenship, dignity,
equality, social and economic justice, and cultural rights.33 I deal
with these values separately below.
A. Democracy and Rights of Citizenship
The transition from apartheid and authoritarianism to democracy
in South Africa at the end of the twentieth century captured the
global imagination. 34 Operating during a different historical phase
31 See DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 30, 53, 54; ANTHONY SAMPSON, MANDELA: THE
AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 36, 37 (1999).
32 DUBERMAN, supra note 4, at 414; NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 218-19,
248, 341 (1994).
33 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was published in 1996. Chapter 2 of
the Constitution is the Bill of Rights, which contains sections including protective measures
to ensure protection for the values outlined. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2.
34 See HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 46
(2010); NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID,
DEMOCRACY 160 (4th ed. 2007). See also Seo Sang-Hyun, A Study on Democratic Transition
in South Africa: Democracy Through Compromise and Institutional Choice 431-32 (Nov.
2008) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of South Africa), available at
http://uir.unisa.ac.zafbitstream/handle/10500/3401/thesis-seo s.pdf;jsessionid=EB2F85FCA4
6110AB86A731041885160?sequence=l (describing the role that international players had in
the transitional process in South Africa).
2013/2014]
Albany Law Review
of international politics, the anti-apartheid movement proved to be
one of the most captivating and ubiquitous of the twentieth century
global human rights movements. The anti-apartheid movement
generated advocacy and activism on all continents, from a range of
constituents within government and in the private sphere.35 After
the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, and as the country
geared up for its first ever democratic elections, scores of people
from around the globe participated in the electoral process,
including serving as electoral monitors in the first democratic
election.3 6 As the most famous political prisoner of the twentieth
century, Nelson Mandela became the penultimate symbol of
freedom and democracy, and conversely of the illegitimacy of the
apartheid regime. 37 His election and ascendancy to the Presidency
of a free and democratic South Africa, demonstrating a moral
leadership unparalleled in Africa (or indeed much of the global
community), created a palpable national and global euphoria.38
Nelson Mandela's capacity to forgive his previous jailers and
tormentors also set him apart from other leaders,3 9 and South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission contributed to a
global burgeoning in transitional justice, truth commissions, and
other post-conflict processes and institutions. 40 Seen as the "gold
standard" of truth commissions, South Africa's Truth Commission
has served as a yardstick for societies undergoing transitions to
democracy. 41
Between 1990 and 1994-that is between Nelson Mandela's
release from prison and the first democratic elections-legal
theorists and constitutional scholars from around the world traveled
to South Africa, committed to using their experience, skills, and
talents in the hope that the new democratic South Africa would
36 HAKAN THORN, ANTI-APARTHEID AND THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2-3
(2006).
36 Douglas G. Anglin, International Monitoring of the Transition to Democracy in South
Africa, 1992-1994, 94 AFR. AFF. 519, 519, 541-42 (1995).
37 See SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 415.
38 Id. at 486.
39 See LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR
MODEL? 18-21 (2002).
40 See Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 5, 6, 15, 19-20
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
41 See Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe, Introduction: Assessing the South
African Transitional Justice Model, in TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID
THE TRC DELIVER? 1, 8 (Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van Der Merwe eds., 2008); Penelope E.
Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1155, 1173 (2004).
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embrace the legal and constitutional principles and values that they
held dear, and which had become the corpus of the formal
international human rights framework. 42 Indeed, during these four
years, South Africa was virtually one long constitutional law
workshop. 43
The end result of this concerted intellectual energy was a
vindication for these scholars and advocates, and they were not
disappointed. The South African constitutional text incorporated a
comprehensive set of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights.44 Most significantly, the constitution reflected the most
idealistic and progressive constitutional developments globally,
including a consideration of foreign and international law by those
interpreting the constitution. 45
From this historical distance, it is apparent that the post-
apartheid "revolution" in South Africa was largely a legal one.
46
Just as the processes of law and legalism entrenched and reinforced
the system of apartheid, so too does the inclusion of rights, legal
processes, and constitutional law underpin the establishment and
maintenance of the democratic state.47
The political transition since the country's first democratic
election in April 1994 was spearheaded by a bold and overarching
constitutional framework, underpinned by a bill of rights that
embraced a range of classic civil and political, as well as economic,
social, and cultural rights.48 This constitutional framework left no
doubt as to the transformative possibilities captured in its
substance and processes. 49  The constitution was a purposive
42 See e.g., Sang-Hyun, supra note 34, at 412-22 (analyzing election results for each
branch of the government and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission).
43 This remark was shared with me by my friend, the Honorable Justice Dennis Davis of
the Cape High Court, who has written extensively on comparative constitutional issues. For
an example of these writings, see DENNIS DAVIS, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION:
TRANSFORMATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1999).
44 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2.
46 "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court.., must consider international law. Id. §
39(1). "When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law." Id. at ch. 14, § 233.
46 See MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936:
FEAR, FAVOUR AND PREJUDICE 513 (2001).
47 See id. at 513, 529.
48 See MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
UNITED STATES 6 (2009).
49 See, e.g., Dennis M. Davis & Karl Klare, Transformative Constitutionalism and the
Common and Customary Law, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 403, 404 (2010) (discussing the
transformative nature of the South African Constitution).
2013/2014]
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document moving the country from a racist, authoritarian past, to a
state that embraced human rights for all. 50 This point has been
most profoundly made by the prominent American-Kenyan human
rights scholar, Dean Makau wa Matua:
The construction of the post-apartheid state represents the
first deliberate and calculated effort in history to craft a
human rights state-a polity that is primarily animated by
human rights norms. South Africa was the first state to be
reborn after the universal acceptance, at least rhetorically, of
human rights ideals by states of all the major cultural and
political traditions.51
B. Dignity and Equality
The South African Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights,
has been universally heralded as one of the most impressive human
rights documents of the twentieth century.52 Chapter one states
very clearly the supremacy of the constitution, and also states that
the new democratic state is founded on values that include
"[h]uman dignity [and] the achievement of equality" as well as
"[n]on-racialism and non-sexism."53  The constitution's generous
coverage of a broad range of categories of discrimination, including
race, gender, sexual orientation, and social origin, seeks to reassure
all South Africans that discrimination in its obvious, as well as
intricate, variations will not be tolerated. 54
Covering both direct and indirect discrimination and recognition
of the tenacity of institutionalized discrimination, 55 the bill of rights
also covers intersectional discrimination, noting that "[n]o person
may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds."56 This comprehensive definition of equality
also embodies a clear commitment to affirmative action, which
provides that "[t]o promote the achievement of equality, legislative
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or
50 Id. at 404 n.6.
51 Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997).
52 Penelope E. Andrews, Incorporating International Human Rights Law in National
Constitutions: The South African Experience, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 835, 841
(Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008).
53 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, § 1(a)-(c).
64 Id. at ch. 2, § 9(3).
55 Penelope E. Andrews, 'Big Love'? The Recognition of Customary Marriages in South
Africa, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1483, 1487-88 (2007).
56 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 9(4) (emphasis added).
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categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may
be taken."57 The dignity provision is stated succinctly, namely, that
"[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity
respected and protected."58
C. Social and Economic Justice
But the incorporation of a broad range of social and economic
rights is arguably the most significant, and potentially potent
weapon, against poverty and economic inequality. 59  The
incorporation of these rights as well as their enforcement may hold
the key to unraveling much of the poverty and despair that
continues to disproportionately burden on a large proportion of
South Africans, the majority of whom are black South Africans. 60
The bill of rights includes a broad array of social and economic
rights, including the right of access to education, 61 the right of
access to housing,62 the right of access to health care, 63 the right of
access to food,64 water,65 and social security.66 These rights provide,
at least within the formal legal paradigm, a limited access for those
who are the most marginalized to pursue social and economic rights
in the courts.
The rights of children are comprehensively covered in the bill of
rights, especially as they relate to their social and economic well-
being.67 Children are given the right "to basic nutrition, shelter,
basic health care services and social services."68 Children are also
"protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation"69 and
57 Id. § 9(2).
58 Id. § 10.
59 See Jeremy Seekings, Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 1994-2007, in AFTER
APARTHEID: REINVENTING SOUTH AFRICA? 21, 22-23 (Ian Shapiro & Kahreen Tebeau eds.,
2011) (analyzing post-Apartheid issues in South Africa, including social and economic rights
and poverty).
60 See id. at 41-46.
61 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 29.
62 Id. § 26.
63 Id. § 27(1)(a).
64 Id. § 27(i)(b).
65 Id.
6 Id. § 27(1)(c).
67 See id. § 28.
6 Id. § 28(1)(c).
69 Id. § 28(1)(d). This section also provides that children have the right "not to be required
or permitted to perform work or provide services that- (i) are inappropriate for a person of
that child's age; or (ii) place at risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental
health or spiritual, moral or social development." Id. § 28(1)(f).
2013/20141
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"exploitative labour practices."70  These rights are provided on
demand, and the provision does not include the limitation found in
other socio-economic rights in the bill of rights, namely, that the




One of the challenges facing the new democratic South Africa in
the post-1990 era was its political, economic, and cultural transition
from a European-centric country in Africa, to one that embraced its
history, legacy, and geography as an African state. 72  As a
European-centric country, successive colonial and apartheid
governments continuously relegated African law and custom as
secondary in the legal framework and legal hierarchy. This created
a formidable challenge of transition to South Africa as an African
State.7 3
This task of transition, with the goal of transformation, was
largely left to the constitutional drafters, and the fruits of their
efforts are incorporated in the South African Constitution. The
constitution is a thoughtful hybrid of "western" and African values
and principles. Indeed, the incorporation of indigenous and
religious minority rights in the constitution and bill of rights has
been much heralded and constantly referenced by constitutional
and human rights scholars and advocates. 74 In addition, judgments
of the Constitutional Court in this regard have been admired,
particularly in the court's human rights jurisprudence.7 5
Idealistically labeled the "rainbow nation," the political transition
through the lens of the comprehensive constitution and under the
leadership of President Nelson Mandela was particularly
70 Id. § 28(l)(e).
71 See, e.g., id. §§ 25, 26, 27.
72 See Heinz Klug, Constitution-Making, Democracy and the "Civilizing" of Irreconcilable
Conflict: What Might We Learn From the South African Miracle?, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 269, 271
(2007) (describing two distinct stages in South Africa's democratic transition; the first, a
violent stage, loosely controlled by existing political bodies and the second, a structured
transition controlled by new democratic governing bodies).
73 See CHANOCK, supra note 46, at 30 (describing the development of South African law as
being tied to the history of colonialism).
74 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 31; see Eric C. Christiansen, Using Constitutional
Adjudication to Remedy Socio-Economic Injustice: Comparative Lessons From South Africa,
13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 369, 371-72 (2008); Henry J. Richardson III, Patrolling
the Resource Transfer Frontier: Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court's
Contributions to International Justice, 9 AFR. STUD. Q. 81, 82 (2007).
75 See infra Part IV; Richardson, supra note 74, at 84.
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inspirational on a continent like Africa, that had experienced
decades of violent conflict and civil strife, often linked to issues of
ethnic identity or cultural rights.7 6
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND TRANSFORMATION
As of 2014, the Constitutional Court has been in existence for
twenty years. 77 During that span of time it has achieved a solid
reputation and an impressive degree of credibility amongst South
Africa's leaders and citizens. 78 Its judgments have been seen as
central to the transformative project of nation-building in South
Africa.7 9
As mentioned earlier, South Africa had to transition from an
authoritarian racist system of parliamentary sovereignty to a
system of constitutional democracy.8 0 This was a mandate for a
comprehensive restructuring of the legal system with respect to
laws, legal processes, legal institutions, legal culture, and staffing of
the courts, administrative tribunals, and other sectors of the legal
system.81 The drafters of the constitution envisaged a fundamental
restructuring of the legal foundations, the legal structure, and the
laws to make the operation of the legal system representative,
accountable, and accessible to all South African citizens.8 2 The
constitutional principles and values were intended to transform all
aspects of the legal system.
The Constitutional Court has deliberated on issues central to this
transformation, and has handed down some judgments that have
had a profound impact on the law in South Africa. I will outline
them through the prism of the issues articulated earlier, that
76 See RICHARD STENGEL, MANDELA'S WAY: FIFTEEN LESSONS ON LIFE, LOVE, AND
COURAGE 40, 41, 64, 98 (2009); see also SIRI GLOPPEN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER THE
CONSTITUTION 6 (1997) (describing the culture of violence that has haunted South Africa).
77 See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 141 (2000).
78 See Penelope Andrews, Without Fear, Favor, or Prejudice: Judicial Independence and
the Transformation of the Judiciary in South Africa, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM:
LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 197, 210 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011).
79 See id. at 210. In addition to its stature within South Africa, the Constitutional Court
has a large international audience. Many American law professors are former clerks of the
court, and many have focused their scholarship on the Constitutional Court. In addition,
scholarly groups like the South Africa Reading Group, hosted by the author and Professor
Stephen Ellmann of New York Law School, regularly focus their attention on the judgments
of the court, and many judges have presented papers at the Reading Group.
80 See KLUG, supra note 77, at 115; Andrews, supra note 78, at 203.
81 See Andrews, supra note 78, at 202, 203; see also GLOPPEN, supra note 76, at 68
(discussing societal transformation using the legal system).
82 See KLUG, supra note 77, at 119; GLOPPEN, supra note 76, at 68.
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formed the core of Paul Robeson's belief system, values, and
advocacy.
A. Democracy and Rights of Citizenship
In this area of law the Constitutional Court has articulated a
broad vision of democracy and the rights of citizenship, seeking to
overturn the legacy of exclusion and discrimination to one of
democracy and equality. The court has been particularly attentive
not just to those groups of South Africans who have been
discriminated against because of their race, ethnicity, gender, or
sexuality, but also to minority groups often ignored in the wider
society.
In 1999, the Constitutional Court confronted the issue of the right
of prisoners awaiting trial and prisoners who have been sentenced
to vote.8 3  The key issue before the court was whether the
constitutional right of prisoners to vote is infringed "if no
appropriate arrangements are made to enable them to register and
vote. '8 4 In this case the lower court held that the Independent
Electoral Commission had no obligation to facilitate the registration
and voting of prisoners.8 5 The Constitutional Court overturned the
lower court's decision, dismissing the notion that prisoners had no
right to vote because they were considered to be "the authors of
their own misfortune."86
The Constitutional Court noted that any adult South African
citizen in possession of an identity document is entitled to apply for
registration as a voter on the national common voters roll and "has
the right to vote in elections for any legislative body established in
terms of the Constitution."8' 7 It is unconstitutional, in the absence of
any disqualifying legislative provision, to preclude prisoners from
registering as voters as well as voting in the general elections.88
Referring to the preamble to the constitution, the court referenced
"that one of the values on which the one, sovereign and democratic
state of the Republic of South Africa is founded is '[u]niversal adult
suffrage' and 'a national common voters roll."'8 9 The constitution
further guarantees the right of every adult citizen "to vote in
83 See August v. Electoral Comm'n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at para. 1 (S. Afr.).
84 Id. at para. 19.
85 See id. at paras. 1, 8.
86 Id. at paras. 20, 42.
87 Id. at para. 15 (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 19(3)).
88 See August, (3) SA 1 at paras. 23, 31.
89 Id. at para. 3 (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.1, § 1(d)).
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elections for any legislative body established in terms of the
Constitution."90  The court stated that the universal franchise is
significant to the individual to reinforce dignity, and for the nation
to reinforce genuine democracy. 91 This right must therefore be
interpreted expansively, to enfranchise rather than disenfranchise
eligible voters.92
In addition to protecting the civil and political rights of citizens,
The Court has struck down executive action deemed
unconstitutional, including action that may have popular
resonance. For example, although the Court could not
provide relief to the complainant, the Court found the
executive had acted unlawfully when it handed over a
terrorist suspect to the American authorities without
obtaining an undertaking that he would not be executed if
found guilty. In another judgment assessing the principles
of representative democracy, the Court delivered a textbook
illustration of the importance of the doctrine of separation of
powers and, more significantly, the central role of judicial
review to strengthen the doctrine. The Court rejected a bill
passed by the parliament on the basis that there had not
been sufficient public consultation, as required by the
Constitution. In an exploratory and thoughtful judgment,
Justice Ngcobo, delivering the opinion for the Court, noted
that South Africa's representative democracy would be
rendered "meaningless without massive participation by the
voters." In addition, he observed that "[t]he participation by
the public on a continuous basis" is crucial to the
"functioning of representative democracy." 93
B. Dignity
In the first case before the newly established Constitutional Court
in 1995, the judges had to decide the constitutionality of the death
90 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 19(3). The court pointed out that "[t]he right to vote by its
very nature imposes positive obligations upon the legislature and the executive." August, (3)
SA 1 at para. 16. This is the reason why the constitution provides for the establishment of
the Independent Electoral Commission as an independent and impartial body to manage the
elections and ensure that they are free and fair. Id.
91 See August, (3) SA 1 at para. 17.
92 Id.
93 Andrews, supra note 78, at 211 (quoting Doctors for Life Int'l v. Speaker of the Nat'l
Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para. 115 (S. Mr.)).
2013/20141
Albany Law Review
penalty.9 4 In a much-anticipated and highly watched decision, the
court heard arguments for three days about whether the death
penalty violated sections nine, ten, and eleven of the interim
constitution, which guaranteed every individual the right to life, the
right to dignity, and the right to be free from torture and cruel
punishment.95 In a detailed judgment, drawing on international
human rights law, the court unanimously found that the death
penalty was indeed unconstitutional, violating the rights to life and
dignity.9 6  Writing the majority opinion, Constitutional Court
President Arthur Chaskalson noted:
The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all
human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in
Chapter Three. By committing ourselves to a society
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required
to value these two rights above all others. And this must be
demonstrated by the State in everything that it does,
including the way it punishes criminals. This is not achieved
by objectifying murderers and putting them to death to serve
as an example to others in the expectation that they might
possibly be deterred thereby.97
The court revisited this issue again when it examined the
constitutionality of extraditing an accused person to a country that
imposes the death penalty.98 The applicant, a foreign national, was
on trial in New York on numerous capital charges arising out of the
bombing of the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
in 1998.99 The South African and American authorities traced the
accused to Cape Town where he was living under an assumed name
and with a false passport.100 He was arrested and interrogated by
South African immigration authorities as an illegal immigrant and
handed over to the FBI for removal to the United States, where the
court told him he was facing the death penalty. 10 1
94 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 1 (S. Afr.).
95 S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 3, §§ 9, 10, 11(2); Makwanyane, (3) SA 416 at para.
10. The South African Constitution was a two-stage drafting process, which included an
interim constitution of 1993 and a final constitution of 1996. For a detailed discussion of the
two constitutions, see THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH
AFRICA'S BASIC LAW (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001).
96 Makwanyane, (3) SA 391 at para. 144.
97 Id.
98 Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) at para. 4 (S.
Aft.).
99 Id. at paras. 8-9.
100 Id. at paras. 9-10.
101 Id. at paras. 2-4.
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The applicant approached the Constitutional Court for an order
declaring his removal to the United States as unconstitutional
without the assurance that he would not be executed. 102 The
applicant was supported by the Society for the Abolition of the
Death Penalty and the Human Rights Committee Trust, which
argued that the handing over and subsequent removal were a
disguised extradition without a safeguard against the death
sentence. 10 3 This violated his constitutional right to life, dignity,
and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment. The South African government argued that the
applicant had been subject to deportation because he had entered
South Africa illegally, had been lawfully arrested, and had been
properly deported to the United States. 104
The court found that the precedent established in Makwanyane,
namely that "capital punishment is inconsistent with the values
and provisions of the interim [c]onstitution" applied with even
greater force to the final constitution. 105 This applied whether the
removal was a deportation or an extradition, regardless of consent
by the applicant.106
The court upheld the applicant's appeal, declaring the handing
over unlawful in the absence of an undertaking that he would not be
executed. Such action infringed his constitutional right to life, to
dignity, and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment.10 7 The court also held that the deportation breached
the Aliens Control Act.'0 The court authorized and directed the
director of the court to draw the judgment to the attention of the
trial court in New York as a matter of urgency. 10 9
102 Id. at paras. 4-5.
103 Id. at para. 3. The South African officials were said also to have breached the law
relating to deportation as specified by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 and its regulations.
Id.
104 Id. at para. 6. The applicant had requested that he be deported to the United States
and not Tanzania, his country of citizenship. Id. at para. 18.
105 Id. at paras. 39-40.
106 Id. at para. 43. Makwanyane established that South Africa cannot expose a person to
the risk of execution, whether by deportation or extradition and regardless of consent. Id. at
paras. 38-39. The Aliens Control Act did not permit deportation of the applicant to the
United States, even if he consented. Id. at paras. 35-36. The court held that the applicant
was unaware of his right under the Act to appeal against deportation and he therefore could
not validly consent to the deportation. Id. at paras. 65-68.






In the area of equality, the Constitutional Court has consistently
given effect to the meaning and text of the constitutional provisions,
and has articulated an expansive definition of equality-mindful of
South Africa's racist, sexist, and homophobic past-and committed
to ensuring that all marginalized South Africans benefit from the
constitutional text.110 The court has been vigilant about ensuring
that the principle of non-discrimination remained unequivocal and
on the issue of discrimination based on sexuality, the court has been
particularly strident. For example, in 1998 the court struck down
the criminal prohibition on sodomy between consenting adult
males."' The court has also proscribed discrimination against HIV-
positive individuals in the workplace. 1 2 In 2005, the court held
that the common law definition of marriage and a section of the
Marriage Act were inconsistent with the constitution.11 3 The court
found "that the failure of the common law and the Marriage Act to
provide the means whereby same-sex couples can enjoy the same
status, entitlements and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual
couples through marriage, constitutes an unjustifiable violation of
their right[s] ."114
The court has also been vigilant in ensuring that women have
access to and benefit from the equality provisions in the
constitution, and that discrimination against women on the basis of
sex and gender be dealt with expeditiously and comprehensively. 1
15
Some of the most insightful equality jurisprudence has emanated
from the court, and its judgments have been hailed for the clarity
110 Penelope Andrews, The South African Constitution as a Mechanism for Redressing
Poverty, in DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN AFRICA: ITS IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE & POVERTY
ALLEVIATION 57, 59 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2006).
111 Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras.
2, 73 (S. Mr.).
112 Hoffmann v. S. African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 40-41 (S. Afr.).
113 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 114 (S. Afr.).
114 Id.
115 See Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work in the United States and South Africo:
The Parallel Processes of Legal and Cultural Change, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
921, 947-48, 954 (2011) (discussing South Africa's gender violence and employment reform
efforts under South Africa's domestic and sexual violence reform movements); Felicity
Kaganas & Christina Murray, Law and Women's Rights in South Africa: An Overview, in
GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 1, 35-36 (1994); but see Deborah
Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law in the United States and South Africa: Facilitating the
Transition from Legal Standards to Social Norms, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 196-201
(2002) (discussing the inequality that is still present for most women despite the progressive
sexual harassment legislation).
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with which the judges, particularly the first two female judges of
the court, have articulated the notion of substantive equality. 116 For
example, in 1996 the court outlawed unfair discrimination on the
grounds of sex and women's access to insurance policies. 117 In an
oft-cited opinion, the court had occasion to rule on a constitutional
challenge on the basis of sex and gender, brought by a male
prisoner, the father of a twelve-year old child, to an executive order
by President Mandela, which granted special remission of sentences
for certain categories of prisoners." 8 The only prisoners who stood
to benefit from the executive order were "all mothers in prison on 10
May 1994, with minor children under the age of twelve (12)
years." 9  In a lengthy and controversial opinion, the court
examined the reasons for the President's pardon and despite its
generalization about mothers being the primary caregivers of
children, the court found that this did not amount to unfair
discrimination. 120 The court saw the need "to develop a concept of
unfair discrimination which recognises that although a society
which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of
equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by
insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that
goal is achieved."'12 The court has also insisted on equality between
South African citizens and those who are lawful permanent
residents, striking down regulations that prevent permanent
residents from holding permanent posts as teachers. 122
Dealing with the issue of violence against women as interfering
with a women's right to equality, the court has determined that
there is a duty on the part of courts to develop the common law,
including the law of negligence, by imposing a duty on the police to
prevent sexual violence against women. 23
D. Cultural Rights
In the area of cultural rights, the Constitutional Court has been
attentive to the challenges of contemporary South Africa, and the
116 See Andrews, supra note 78, at 208, 210.
117 Brink v. Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at paras. 43, 50, 60 (S. Mr.).
118 President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras. 1-3 (S. Mr.).
119 Id. at para. 2 (quoting Presidential Act No. 17 of 27 June 1994).
120 See Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 37, 48.
121 Id. at para. 41.
122 Larbi-Odam v. Member of the Exec. Council for Educ. (Nw. Province) 1998 (1) SA 745
(CC) at paras. 2, 49 (S. Afr.).




need to marry the traditional and the contemporary within a legal
framework that has always relegated indigenous law to the margins
of the formal legal system.124 South Africa's transition from an
authoritarian state embedded in racism to one premised on
democracy and human rights for all its citizens meant that
appropriate deference had to be provided to indigenous law and
custom. As mentioned earlier in this article, the constitutional text
provides for the right of all South Africans who belong "to a
cultural, religious or linguistic community.., to enjoy their culture,
practise their religion and use their language."'125 The constitution
also provides for members of such communities "to form, join and
maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations."'126
But the constitution also recognizes that certain individuals and
groups within these communities may be disadvantaged by
traditional laws and custom, and therefore it includes the caveat
that these rights "may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with any provision of the Bill of Rights."'127
The number of cases decided by the Constitutional Court
regarding the issues of cultural rights has been rather limited. This
may be that communities or individuals have chosen an informal
path in settling disputes, or it may be that parties who wish to bring
claims before the court have limited resources. Nonetheless, the
cases decided by the court have generally indicated a fine balancing
by the judges between the rights of individuals and groups to
exercise their cultural rights within the human rights framework of
the constitution. 128
For example, in 2007 the court found that the prohibition against
wearing a nose stud to a public school amounted to unfair
discrimination on grounds of religion and culture. 129 The court has
also mandated that the customary law be developed to bring it in
line with the constitutional commitment to gender equality. 30 The
124 See Penelope E. Andrews, Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the Boundaries of
Family, Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2009).
125 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 31(1).
126 Id. § 31(1)(b).
127 Id. § 31(2).
128 See Waheeda Amien, Overcoming the Conflict Between the Right to Freedom of Religion
and Women's Rights to Equality: A South African Case Study of Muslim Marriages, 28 HuM.
RTS. Q. 729, 748 (2006); Tumi Mmusinyane, The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing
Customary Laws in Accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa
2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC), 12 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 136, 154 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1595964.
129 MECfor Educ.: Kwazulu-Natal v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at para. 112 (S. Aft.).
130 See Shilubana v. Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at para. 75 (S. Aft.).
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court found that the appointment of a female chief by customary
institutions, contrary to tradition, was constitutionally
permissible.131 On the other hand, the court has struck down as
constitutionally impermissible long-standing indigenous practices
that continue to discriminate against women. They did this in
2004, reinforcing the primacy of the principle of gender equality and
the right of African women to inherit under the African customary
law of intestate succession. 132
E. Socio-economic Rights
Arguably, it is in the area of socio-economic rights that Paul
Robeson's vision of justice is most pronounced. Referring to the
South African Constitution as transformative, Karl Klare has noted
that the constitution is
[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment,
interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation,
of course, but in a historical context of conducive political
developments) to transforming a country's political and
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic,
participatory, and egalitarian direction. 133
It is with respect to the implementation of socio-economic rights
that the constitution holds much promise. The Constitutional
Court's decisions regarding the enforcement of socio-economic rights
has shown that these rights can bring meaningful relief to the
poorest in the country. 134 In 2000 the Constitutional Court had to
consider the right to housing as incorporated in section 26.135
Although the court had had occasion to interpret the right to health
a few years prior, 1 6 the Grootboom decision was awaited with much
anticipation and is widely regarded as an international test case on
the enforceability of social and economic rights. 137  The case
131 Id. at paras. 82-84.
132 Bhe v. Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at para. 210 (S. Aft.).
133 Karl E. Kare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON
HUM. RTS. 146, 150 (1998); see also Dikgang Moseneke, Transformative Adjudication, 18 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 309, 314 (2002) (describing the need for all branches of government to
aid in the transformative nature of the constitution).
13 David Robitaille, Adjudication of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa: Beyond
the Rhetoric of Illegitimacy and Excessive Complexity, 23 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 215, 223
(2007/2008).
135 Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 1 (S. Mr.).
136 See Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwa Zulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at paras.
11-12 (S. Aft.).
137 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at paras. 1-3.
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concerned an application for temporary shelter brought by a group
of people, including a number of children, who were without shelter
following their brutal eviction from private land on which they were
squatting. 138 The conditions under which the community lived were
deplorable; they had access to one tap and no sanitation facilities. 139
The court affirmed that the government had a duty in terms of
section 26 of the constitution (the right to adequate housing) to
adopt reasonable policy, legislative, and budgetary measures to
provide relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over
their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions. 140 Justice
Yacoob, writing for a unanimous court noted:
I am conscious that it is an extremely difficult task for the
state to meet these obligations in the conditions that prevail
in our country. This is recognized by the constitution which
expressly provides that the state is not obliged to go beyond
available resources or to realise these rights immediately. I
stress however, that despite all these qualifications, these
are rights, and the constitution obliges the state to give effect
to them. This is an obligation that courts can, and in
appropriate circumstances, must enforce. 14
The judgment also dealt in detail with the implications of the
children's socio-economic rights enshrined in the bill of rights.1 42
In The Treatment Action case,1 43 the appeal to the Constitutional
Court was
directed at reversing orders made in a high court against
[the] government because of perceived shortcomings in its
response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS challenge. The court
found that [the] government had not reasonably addressed
the need to reduce the risk of HIV-positive mothers
transmitting the disease to their babies at birth. More
specifically the finding was that government had acted
unreasonably in (a) refusing to make an antiretroviral drug
called nevirapine available in the public health sector where
the attending doctor considered it medically indicated and
(b) not setting out a timeframe for a national programme to
138 Id. at para. 4.
139 See id. at para. 7.
140 Id. at para. 13.
141 Id. at para. 94.
142 Id. at paras. 70-79.
143 Minister Of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) at para. 2 (S.
Afr.).
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prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 144
In addition to focusing on the positive aspects of socio-economic
rights, that is, the obligation of the state to provide certain rights,
the court has also focused on what has been seen as the negative
component of socio-economic rights. In a case involving the
protection of a tenant against eviction in the process of executing a
judgment on debts, the court held that such a process violated the
constitutional right to housing.145 The court has also reaffirmed the
right of access to social security by permanent residents.
146
In a novel decision regarding the eviction of tenants and squatters
in the downtown area of Johannesburg, the court has mandated
that before the government may evict residents from their homes, it
has the duty to engage meaningfully with them about possible steps
that can be taken to alleviate their homelessness. 147 The court has
also held that when depriving residents of electricity, the local
authority is obliged to provide residents with procedural fairness,
including fair notice of the disconnection.1 48 But, the court has also
been mindful of its institutional capacity, and has found
constitutionally valid the policies of local governments that pursue
revenue collection when delivering services in the fulfillment of
their constitutional and statutory duties. So, for example, the court
has found the use of prepayment water meters by a city council
reasonable and lawful.149
V. PAUL ROBESON AND CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA
If Paul Robeson was around today, what might he say about the
"rainbow nation" and its transformative constitutional project? He
might join in the chorus of applause about the text of South Africa's
constitution, the formal imprimatur of rights, and the mostly
impressive series of judgments handed down by the Constitutional
Court.150 He would no doubt celebrate the peaceful transition in
South Africa from apartheid and authoritarianism to democracy,
and particularly the significant role of the Truth and Reconciliation
144 Id. at para. 2.
145 Jaftha v. Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) at paras. 4, 52 (S. Afr.).
146 Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., Mahlaule 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Mr.).
147 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd., Berea Twp., and 197 Main St., Johannesburg v. City of
Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) at paras. 18-19 (S. Mr.).
148 Leon Joseph v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) at paras. 47, 61 (S. Afr.).
149 Lindiwe Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para. 169 (S. Afr.).




But he might pause and ponder the dissonance between the fine
constitutional text and its accompanying court decisions, and the
limited signs of a human rights culture, as evidenced by widespread
violence, particularly against women, African migrants, and
homosexual South Africans. 152 He might wonder why the Mandela
government and its successors have openly embraced the
"Washington consensus" and a form of unregulated capitalism that
has resulted in great wealth for some and the persistent
impoverishment of others?153 He might wonder why the kind of
crony capitalism euphemistically labeled "Black Economic
Empowerment" empowers and enriches only so few, and continues
to fan the flame of black resentment-but now leveled against their
black compatriots.154
Paul Robeson would no doubt be shocked at the specter of black
miners being shot by police officers in a manner reminiscent of
Sharpeville and the dark days of apartheid. 5 5 He might wonder
what happened to that wonderful African concept of dignity-
ubuntu-and why it often seems in such short supply. 56
Paul Robeson would no doubt ponder the bundle of contradictions
that make up South Africa: first world and third world;
contemporary and traditional; great wealth and extreme poverty;
hope and despair.
And he would no doubt wonder why the promise of dignity,
equality, and rights for women, including the right of security in the
public and private domain, still eludes so many South African
women, particularly those who are poor.
151 See Andrews, supra note 41, at 1159.
152 Penelope Andrews, Learning to Love After Learning to Harm: Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, Gender Equality and Cultural Values, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 41, 43-44
(2007); see Charlayne Hunter-Gault, Violated Hopes: A Nation Confronts a Tide of Sexual
Violence, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2012, at 40, 41.
163 See Johannes G. Hoogeveen & Berk Ozler, Not Separate, Not Equal: Poverty and
Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa 2, 22 (William Davidson Institute, Working Paper
No. 739, 2005).
154 See Susan R. Jones & Peggy Maisel, Implementing the Social and Economic Promise of
the Constitution: The Role of South African Legal Education, in LAW AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNANCE 243, 250-51 (Penelope E. Andrews
& Susan Bazilli eds., 2008).
155 See Charlayne Hunter-Gault, A Massacre and a Test for South Africa, THE NEW
YORKER (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/08/a-
massacre-and-a-test-for-south-africa.html.
166 Interpreted as the interconnectedness of our shared humanity, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu utilized this concept frequently as the Chair of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. See DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 31 (1999).
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Yes-Paul Robeson may have celebrated and he may have
lamented-but his legacy has shown that even as one struggle ends,
new ones surface. And that the project of justice, human dignity,
and equality requires ongoing vigilance and continuous struggle.
Paul Robeson started his activism as a student at Rutgers
University in 1915.157 It was only in the 1960s and beyond that we
begin to see the fruits of his commitments, namely, independence in
many African countries; the Civil Rights Act, and the Voting Rights
Act; the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990; and democratic
elections in South Africa in 1994. It is now nearly a century since
Paul Robeson embarked on his journey of international human
rights activism. South Africa is barely twenty years old. All the
promises of the constitution will take some time to come to fruition.
VI. POST-SCRIPT: PAUL ROBESON IN ALBANY, MAY 1947
In 1947,
Paul Robeson scheduled a concert of Negro spiritual music in
Philip Livingston Junior High School in Albany. The Albany
Board of Education had approved the concert in September
1946. On April 22, 1947 the concert permit was revoked
after Mayor Corning called the Board's attention to the fact
that the House Committee on Un-American Activities had
named Robeson as "one of a group invariably found
supporting the Communist Party and its front organizations
and that on one occasion Robeson had sung Communist
songs as an encore at a concert."'158
Although Mayor Corning persuaded the Board to revoke
Robeson's permit, Robeson successfully challenged the revocation on
the grounds of breach of contract, and Judge Isadore Brookstein of
State Supreme Court found in his favor. The concert took place at
Livingstone Junior High School as planned.
In 1998, the Albany Common Council unanimously adopted a
resolution, presented by Alderperson Sarah Curry-Cobb, honoring
Paul Robeson and the residents of Albany who, in 1947, insisted
that Paul Robeson be permitted to sing in Albany and declaring
May 9, 1998, "Paul Robeson Day" in the City of Albany.
157 See SWINDALL, supra note 6, at 19-21, 33, 42.
158 Kevin J. Roberts, Paul Robeson in Albany-May 9th, 1947, SUNY AT ALBANY DEP'T OF
HISTORY (1999), http://www.albany.edu/history/robeson1947.html (quoting Charles Padula,
Court Rules Robeson May Sing in City, TIMES UNION, May 7, 1947, at 1).
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